A great deal of prestigious humanities writing is gibberish, and the people who produce it are hacks. The difficulty isn’t the price of deep ideas. It’s a disguise. Strip the jargon from a typical sentence of critical theory and what’s left is either a platitude or nothing at all, and the authors are counting on nobody doing the stripping.

Bullshit, precisely

Harry Frankfurt drew the useful distinction. A liar cares about the truth enough to hide it. A bullshitter doesn’t care about it at all. His language is aimed at making an impression, not at saying something that could turn out to be true or false. Academic obscurantism is bullshit in exactly that sense. It’s piled with abstraction and stacked with what Helen Sword called zombie nouns: verbs and adjectives embalmed into nominalisations, so “people resist” becomes “the problematisation of resistance”. The point is to sound like thought without exposing a claim anyone could check.

Judith Butler is the emblem. In 1998 one of her sentences, ninety-odd words of hegemony, rearticulation, and structural totalities, won first prize in the Bad Writing Contest run by the journal Philosophy and Literature. It wasn’t a fluke. It was the house style of a whole school, and it has only spread since.

It is measurable

This isn’t a matter of taste. Analyses of large bodies of academic writing show readability falling steadily for decades: longer sentences, more jargon, more abstract nouns. Specialisation and the curse of knowledge, where experts forget what outsiders don’t know, explain some of that density. Physics papers are hard because physics is hard. They don’t explain why writing about novels and social movements reads worse than writing about particle physics.

The most damning evidence comes from fraud. Studies of retracted scientific papers found that fraudulent ones are measurably more obfuscated than honest ones: less readable, heavier with jargon. When you have something to hide, you make scrutiny expensive. Opacity is what the dishonest reach for, because it works.

It doesn’t even impress

The trick should fail on its own terms. Daniel Oppenheimer’s experiments showed that needlessly long words make writers seem less intelligent, not more, and make their text less credible. Ordinary readers can smell it. The style survives anyway, because it isn’t written for ordinary readers.

In 1996 the physicist Alan Sokal submitted a deliberately meaningless article, stuffed with fashionable jargon about quantum gravity being a social construct, to the cultural studies journal Social Text. They published it. The editors couldn’t tell sense from well-dressed nonsense, because in their field the dress was the sense.

Why it persists

Dense language is a tribal badge. It marks who belongs to the in-group, signals sophistication, and puts up a wall that protects the authority of whoever is behind it. To argue with it, you first have to learn its dialect, and by the time you have, you’ve been half absorbed.

The incentives all point the same way. Publish-or-perish rewards producing text, not making it clear, and there’s almost no career cost to being opaque. Students learn by imitation, so they copy the densest things they’re assigned and assume that’s what serious writing looks like. Whole traditions of continental philosophy and critical theory treat difficulty as proof of depth, so an obscure sentence passes as a profound one by default.

Above all, obscurity protects thin ideas. A plain claim can be checked, tested, and refuted. “Gender is something you do, not something you are” can be argued with. Wrap it in five hundred words of performativity and iterability and it becomes unfalsifiable, which is to say unaccountable. That suits a movement whose aim is to rewrite social norms rather than to describe the world accurately. Its sharpest claims would never survive being stated simply, so they never are.