I have a soft spot for economic history. Not the charts-and-equations kind, but the stories: a besieged city, a war financed with printed money, a diamond cartel patrolling a coastline with gunboats. They make abstract ideas feel real. But lately I’ve noticed that a lot of these stories get told the same way every time, with the same ending, and I want to think through why that bothers me even when I mostly agree with the ending.

The stories that hold up

Take the airlines. For decades, you needed government permission to fly a route in the United States. The Civil Aeronautics Board decided who could fly where and what they could charge, and it mostly protected the big incumbents. Europe had its own version, a legally backed price-fixing arrangement that at one point made a short hop inside Europe pricier than crossing the Atlantic. Then deregulation came: the US in 1978, Europe in the early 1990s. Low-cost carriers appeared, and flying stopped being a luxury.

I think about this every time I book a cheap flight. Whatever people mean when they use “deregulation” as a scare word, this is one case where it clearly made ordinary people’s lives better.

The Confederate inflation is another story that deserves its place. The Confederacy funded its war by printing money and borrowing instead of taxing. Prices rose around 10% a month for years. The government blamed speculators and imposed price controls, and shortages followed. It’s an old pattern and it keeps coming back, so I don’t mind hearing it again.

The Robinson-Patman Act is a genuinely strange one: a 1936 US law meant to protect small shops from chain stores, which ended up punishing a salt company for offering volume discounts. Economists from very different camps have criticised it for decades, and it’s still on the books.

Where the stories get too tidy

The trouble starts when the details get sanded off to make the moral cleaner.

Numbers that sound precise but aren’t. You’ll often hear that a family trip from Paris to Milan cost 1,600 euros in 1992 and 100 in 2017. The euro didn’t exist in 1992. Maybe it’s a converted figure, but it’s presented with a precision it hasn’t earned. Same with the claim that US airfares fell over 50% after deregulation. Probably true in real terms, but deregulation wasn’t the only cause. More efficient jets, computerised booking, and hub networks all mattered. Deregulation also brought bankruptcies, cramped seats, and small cities losing service. I still think it was a net win. I just think we should admit it came with a bill.

Villains chosen for effect. The De Beers story is often told as a cartel “controlled by the Rothschild bank.” The Rothschilds helped finance Cecil Rhodes early on, but for most of the twentieth century De Beers was run by the Oppenheimer family through Anglo American. Reaching for the Rothschild name in a story about a secretive cartel isn’t a neutral choice, given how that name gets used. And the famous Soviet diamond deal usually gets dated to the 1970s, when the big Siberian finds actually came in the 1950s.

Half the cause, presented as the whole. British unemployment in the 1980s is sometimes explained as purely the fault of union power and wage inflation. Unions were part of it. But so was a deliberately tight monetary policy, a strong pound hurting exporters, and a decline in coal and heavy industry that started long before Thatcher.

The siege of Antwerp in 1584–85 is a classic price-control lesson: the city capped the price of bread, so nobody had a reason to bring bread in. That part is true. But the Duke of Parma had also built a bridge across the Scheldt to physically cut the city off. Price controls made the blockade worse. They didn’t create it.

Uruguay’s slide into dictatorship gets the same treatment: too much welfare state, therefore collapse. The welfare state did outgrow the economy. But there was also a guerrilla insurgency, Cold War pressure, and falling export prices. “Welfarism, therefore tanks” is a morality play, not history.

What I actually believe

I don’t disagree with most of the conclusions. Price controls usually cause shortages. Cartels hurt consumers. Restricting housing supply pushes up prices, which is why places like Palo Alto saw prices quadruple in a decade when almost nothing new got built. None of this is fringe; it’s roughly mainstream economics.

What bothers me is when every example is picked to prove the same point, and every inconvenient detail disappears. At that point it stops being history and becomes a sermon. And sermons only work on people who already agree.

The irony is that the best story in this whole collection is the one that doesn’t fit the usual script. De Beers gave up its cartel around 2000 not because a government broke it up, but because it had become too expensive to run. Demand swung around, holding prices fixed cost a fortune, and its market share fell from about 80% to under 40%. Nobody had to intervene. The market wore the monopoly down on its own. That’s a more interesting lesson than “government bad,” and it’s more convincing too.

Economic history is at its best when it complicates what you already believe. I’d like to read more of it told that way, including by people I agree with.