The nation and the state are not the same thing. The nation is the people: their language, culture, and communities. The state is the apparatus that taxes and governs them, and it lives off what they produce. Confusing the two is how centralisation gets sold as patriotism. Nothing about the last century of the Western world suggests that bigger, more centralised government has made nations more vital or more sure of who they are.

Political size is not economic size

We tend to assume that larger political units mean larger markets, and larger markets mean more wealth. But political integration and economic integration are different things. One is a government extending its power to tax and regulate over more territory. The other is people trading and dividing labour across more places. The first does nothing for the second. Switzerland and Albania are both small; only one is rich. The United States and the Soviet Union were both vast; only one had a real market. Size tells you nothing. What matters is how much the government takes.

Exit is the real constraint on power

What size does change is how easily people can leave. A small government has close neighbours. If it taxes and regulates much more than they do, its most productive people walk across the border, and its revenue goes with them. No father could do to his household, and no mayor to his village, what modern states routinely do to their citizens. They would be overthrown or abandoned by the next morning.

This is why capitalism was born in the most fragmented corner of the world: the Italian city-states, southern Germany, and the Low Countries. Europe’s thousands of competing rulers couldn’t afford to squeeze their subjects too hard.

Freer states then tend to grow richer, win wars, and swallow their neighbours. But every victory leaves fewer rivals, further away, and makes leaving harder. As exit disappears, so does the reason to stay free. A single world government is the limit of this process: wherever you go, the same taxes and the same rules. The steady growth of taxation and regulation across the West in the twentieth century is what that trend looks like in practice.

Secession reverses it

Breaking away doesn’t guarantee better government. But it does replace a relationship of domination with one of contract and trade, and forced integration with voluntary separation. Forced integration breeds resentment, because every failure can be blamed on the other group. Separation makes each community own its results, and pushes it to learn from whoever is doing better.

It also brings exit back. A newly independent region immediately has to compete to keep its most productive people, which means lower taxes and more respect for property. And the smaller a territory, the more it has to trade. Russia could survive behind a tariff wall. A single town couldn’t. A single household that trades freely can be as rich as anyone on earth, and one that doesn’t would starve. Small states are pushed toward free trade by necessity.

Smaller units also get to decide for themselves who settles among them, instead of having it decided for them by a distant central government. And they preserve the diversity of languages and cultures that centuries of centralisation have flattened.

Where this leads

The Hoppean picture is a Europe of hundreds of regions, cantons, and free cities, with places like Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra as the rule rather than the oddity. They would compete for residents with low taxes, open trade, and sound money like gold. It sounds utopian. But the alternative we’ve been building, bigger and more distant government with nowhere left to go, has a much worse track record.

If you really care about your nation, you shouldn’t stand in the way of people leaving rulers they never chose.