Nationalism is the golden calf of the right. Every right-wing movement worships it in some form, whether ethnic, cultural, or civic, and it has only grown more central as the left has embraced universalism. That makes it worth taking seriously when the sharpest case against nationalism comes from inside the right itself. Alain de Benoist, founder of the French Nouvelle Droite and the thinker behind much of the European identitarian scene, argues that the nation-state destroyed the very traditions the right claims to defend. He’s mostly right about that. He’s wrong about what did the killing, and wrong to think the old identities were any less made than the new ones.

Who are “the people”?

De Benoist starts with a simple question: where does political legitimacy reside?

Under a king, it resided in the king. Below him lay a patchwork of provinces, towns, guilds, and villages with their own languages and their own laws, held together only by loyalty to the same man. A Breton peasant and a Frankish merchant had little in common, and it didn’t matter. They were both his subjects.

Move legitimacy from the king to the people, and a question appears that nobody had needed to answer: who exactly are the people? You have to draw a line around them, and the obvious line is the border. Territory and state become part of the definition of who belongs. Then more questions follow on their own. If the people are one political body with one will, shouldn’t they share one law instead of a hundred? One language, so they can deliberate together? What about those inside the borders who don’t feel part of the body at all?

Each answer pushes the same way, towards homogenisation and centralisation. The patchwork has to go. Local law gives way to national law, regional tongues to the national language, local weights and measures to the metric system.

Monarchy versus the Jacobins

De Benoist doesn’t object to loving your own people, language, or way of life. Those attachments are far older than the nation. What’s new is that one of them is made total, absorbing every loyalty beneath it and denying any above it. Nationalism is the end point of that process: the only identity left is the nation, and every Frenchman from every corner of France becomes the same interchangeable part.

That doesn’t mean the nation sets out to wipe regional cultures off the map. It means suppressing them is its logical conclusion. Picture 1870, with Prussia marching on France. The state has to mobilise the whole country. Now picture the south shrugging, because a province 500 miles away has nothing to do with life in their valley. From where they stand, they’re right, and that’s the problem. A population that thinks of its region first can’t be moved as one body, and a state that can’t move its population as one body loses. Strong regional identities aren’t an inconvenience to the nation-state. They’re a threat to it.

So de Benoist distinguishes two kinds of centralisation. The monarchy of Louis XIV centralised law and administration, but legitimacy still sat with the crown. It didn’t much matter what you called yourself, where you came from, or what dialect you spoke, as long as you were loyal to the king. Revolutionary centralisation went further. It set out to produce the nation directly, by re-engineering society around one identity that didn’t depend on who happened to rule. The Jacobins abolished the guilds, carved the country into departments of roughly equal size named after rivers and mountains, and declared war on regional languages, which the Abbé Grégoire’s 1794 report called patois to be annihilated. When the Vendée rose against conscription and the attack on its Church, the Republic crushed it with massacres.

Here is the core of the critique. If a right-winger fights to preserve tradition, how can he hold up nationalism as his highest ideal, when it’s the thing that destroyed tradition? The guilds that gave a man his trade and his status were abolished by law. A thousand years of Burgundy were reduced to geographic descriptions. The language your great-grandfather spoke was driven out of the school as an embarrassment to be corrected. All of it was done in the name of one people, indivisible, with one will. The nation-state didn’t preserve the old ways of life. It consumed them, and left a population in which a Bavarian and a Prussian, or a Sicilian and a Venetian, are just two Germans or two Italians with some minor differences of accent.

The first floor of globalism

Then comes the provocative part. The right hates globalism because peoples and cultures are not interchangeable. De Benoist agrees, and says nationalism isn’t the opposite of globalism. It’s the first step towards it.

Spend two centuries teaching a Breton, a Basque, a Corsican, and a Gascon that they’re all simply Frenchmen, that their tongues are embarrassing dialects and their local loyalties something to grow out of, and you’ve done the hard part of the globalist’s job for him. You’ve established that difference is something to flatten, and that real belonging happens at the level of millions of strangers. The globalist only has to take the same logic up one more floor. The nationalist erases the difference between a Breton and a Corsican to make a Frenchman. The white nationalist erases the difference between a Frenchman and a Swede to make a white man. The globalist erases the difference between a European and a South American to make a citizen of the world. It’s the same move at a bigger scale.

So de Benoist asks nationalists on what principle they object to melting nations down when they were happy to melt a hundred regional peoples into one. Nationalism and globalism agree that people become freer and more modern the more you strip away the concrete communities they come from. They only disagree about where to stop. The root of both is the idea that legitimacy flows up from an undivided mass called the people. Accept that, and you’ve conceded that the mass must first be made uniform. All that’s left is haggling over its size.

The odd thing is that a left-wing globalist could share this analysis word for word. They’d just draw the opposite conclusion: if merging neighbouring tribes was fine, keep merging. De Benoist concludes that the root has to go.

Empire, not nation

His alternative isn’t a return to feudalism, which he admits can’t be done. He’s a pan-Europeanist who thinks Europeans should cooperate as a civilisation, and that Europeans killing each other over nation or religion is always a tragedy. That only looks like a contradiction. In his essay “The Idea of Empire” and the Manifesto for a European Renaissance, he argues that an empire isn’t a bigger nation. An emperor rules over other sovereigns, not over territory. Charlemagne was emperor and at the same time king of the Franks and king of the Lombards, so loyalty to him never meant submitting to a particular people. Empire is a principle of unity compatible with any number of local forms of government.

The institutional shape he has in mind comes from the seventeenth-century German jurist Johannes Althusius: a federation of communities rather than a single command structure with branch offices. Think of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Europe of a thousand Liechtensteins, except that every one of them belongs to a European federation. A Holy Roman Empire for the whole continent.

Every identity was made

I think de Benoist is largely right that nationalism undermines regional identities, and that losing them is a real loss. Any right-winger should agree. My problem is that identities have always shifted. They aren’t fixed and timeless, written into the laws of the universe, the way some nationalists imagine when they trace their people back to the dawn of time. Bavarian, Breton, and Corsican all came into being at some point. They’re social constructs, which doesn’t mean they aren’t real. Anyone can look up where his grandparents came from. It means they formed and changed through contact with neighbours, through migration, and through conquest.

If identities build up in layers, the nation is just a newer layer of the same process that produced Bavaria and Brittany. Most of the German identities we know, Austrian among them, didn’t exist in Roman times. The South Slavic peoples didn’t exist in the Balkans before the Slavic migrations of the sixth and seventh centuries. Without them, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, and Bulgarians would be something else entirely. If those identities could evolve, there’s nothing wrong in principle with French or German evolving the same way.

De Benoist could reply that he never objected to identities forming, only to one method: the legislated flattening of existing communities by a central state. Bavaria cohered slowly over centuries from a sixth-century frontier duchy under Frankish overlordship. France was homogenised by decree and bayonet. Comparing the two is a false equivalence.

But what does “organic” mean there? Usually it means far enough in the past that the violence has been forgotten and the result feels natural. The Saxons were hammered into shape by Charlemagne’s conquest and forced Christianisation, including the massacre at Verden in 782. Over the following centuries their identity developed in what we’d call an organic way, but that doesn’t change how it started. If time is the only test, the distinction is chronological, not principled, and the nationalist can answer: give my nation the same centuries as your Bavaria and it will look just as organic. No people, past or present, was formed without some conquest and coercion.

Railways, not decrees

My strongest objection is about cause. Nationalism didn’t deal the killing blow to regional cultures. Modernity did. Railways and factories pulled people out of the countryside and into cities. Later the radio, the car, and the television wore down dialects and local customs far more thoroughly than any language law.

De Benoist likes to focus on France, and the best book on France makes the point. In Peasants into Frenchmen (1976), the historian Eugen Weber showed that France became a nation much later than people assume. The Jacobins declared war on regional languages, but they lacked the means to win it. Regional languages and identities were still strong late into the nineteenth century, and as late as 1902 the government was still trying to stop priests preaching in Breton. What turned peasants into Frenchmen, between 1870 and 1914, was the roads and railways that drew villages into national markets, along with compulsory schooling and military service. The state played its part, but only once the infrastructure of the modern economy gave it the reach the revolutionaries never had.

Identities, cultures, and whole peoples fade and change like everything else, and usually something larger swallows them. Britain had Celts, then Anglo-Saxons, and in time they became the English. That doesn’t mean the English don’t exist. A thousand years ago my ancestors called themselves something I might not recognise, and in two hundred years my descendants will be called something I wouldn’t recognise either.

A flame, not a museum

That’s why I think civilisational identities will matter more in the coming decades, and why I’m a pan-Europeanist too, though by a different route than de Benoist’s.

The men who came before us weren’t curators standing guard over an exhibit. They broke their backs on hard soil, buried their children, married girls from the next valley, learned a new trade when the old one stopped feeding anyone, and changed a little each generation while telling themselves nothing had changed. Handing something down was more like carrying a flame than guarding an object, and each generation fed it with whatever fuel that year provided.

So we shouldn’t forget who our ancestors were, which doesn’t mean trying to become them again. We can’t, and I doubt they’d want us stuck there. You inherit something you didn’t build, and the world won’t sit still long enough for you to keep it exactly as you found it. What you owe is to pass it on in a state your grandfather wouldn’t be ashamed of. That means knowing his name, knowing which village your family came from and why they left, keeping the few words your grandmother used that nobody says any more, and visiting the graves once a year even though nobody would notice if you didn’t. None of that stops change. It decides whether a people is carried along by it or chooses where it’s going.